The way in which xenia and Judeo-Christian morals differ is in the extent to which the person is obligated. Judeo-Christianity obligation of hospitality comes from the desire to serve God; an obligation demonstrated with the Lord’s words, “Verily I say unto you, Inasmuch as ye have done [service] unto one of the least of these [strangers,] my brethren, ye have done it unto me.” Matthew 25:40. Judeo-Christianity believes that as we serve one another, we are serving God. As such, service to strangers is an obligation from our love of God and desire to serve Him.
In the hymn of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, “A Poor Wayfaring Man of Grief,” an individual finds them self constrained to help another. We know that the person who the narrator was serving was a stranger as they narrate, “I had not pow'r to ask his name, Whereto he went, or whence he came.” Although a stranger, the narrator goes on to serve by feeding him, giving him drink, clothing him, giving him rest, healing and refreshing him, and comforting him in prison. These services align directly with those mentioned in verses 35-40 of Matthew 25 and like at the end of these verses, the narrator discovers at the end of the hymn that they were serving the Savior and sings; “Then in a moment to my view/ The stranger started from disguise./ The tokens in his hands I knew;/ The Savior stood before mine eyes./ He spake, and my poor name he named,/ "Of me thou hast not been ashamed./ These deeds shall thy memorial be;/ Fear not, thou didst them unto me.” The narrator did good by serving the Savior and taking Him in, even though He was thought only to be a stranger. This is the Judeo-Christian moral constraint, to serve others in order to serve God. It is not an active responsibility for which one will be condemned if not followed, but it is seen as something good to do. There is no law or custom that requires it, but if one wishes to serve God, they can seek out serving others.
Although service to strangers is incredibly important to Judeo-Christians, it does not reach the level of moral responsibility of xenia. Xenia, was a binding moral duty. Xenia is a tradition-created quasi-law that requires offering protection and hospitality to strangers. (Princeton- Two Basic Greek Terms http://www.princeton.edu/~aford/terms.html). Ancient Grecians were not only required to be kind to strangers, but to give them food and shelter in the server’s home. Guests were sacred and need be protected.
Telemachos in Book One of the Odyssey perfectly demonstrated xenia as through his actions toward Athene “[He said to her,] 'Welcome, stranger. You shall be entertained as a guest among us. Afterward, when you have tasted dinner, you shall tell us what your need is.'… [A]nd he led her and seated her in a chair, with a cloth to sit on, the chair splendid and elaborate. For her feet there was a footstool. For himself, he drew a painted bench next her, apart from the others, the suitors, for fear the guest, made uneasy by the uproar, might lose his appetite there among overbearing people...” (1.118-124, 130-134). Telemachos gave up all comfort for Athene. This is considerably different from the Judeo-Christian view. The extent of obligation of Judeo-Christians is not strict, one is only meant to help another however the server deems best. This is a stark contrast to xenia’s demand that all protection and comfort be given to strangers who are taken in as house guests. Where Judeo-Christianity views hospitality toward strangers as morally right, xenia makes this generosity morally compelling.
Fundamentally, however, xenia and Judeo-Christian religious obligations are the same. The level of obligation to strangers differs, but both are rooted in the same idea of kindness. Although religiously-based, Matthew 25 indicates that people were being kind long before they knew that they were serving God by serving their fellow men. Xenia too has similar roots. Long before there was some level of obligation, Zeus, also known as Zeus Xenios, had the roll of protector of guests. This predates the obligation of man to be kind to guests. In both instances, before a mandate connected to religion or to quasi-law customs, people (such as Zeus or those hearing Christ in Matthew 25) were performing a kindness to strangers. Therefore, although now rooted in either tradition or religion, both concepts started with the seed of kindness. One seed grew into tradition and custom, while another grew into a religious obligation. Morally, both see serving strangers and loving them as the right thing to do. The level of service and obligation is the only true difference, and even then, both are capable of reaching the same level.
Whether through a strict duty such as xenia, a religious/moral obligation like in Judeo-Christianity, or otherwise, the treatment of strangers is a mark of a civilized society. The question of the nature of man has stumped philosophers and psychologists for centuries. Are humans naturally good, evil, or neutral? Hobbes and Rousseau presented opposing views of humanity; Hobbes believed that men are naturally bad and that our brutish and short lives were improved by the laws of society (Leviathan) while Rousseau believed that men were naturally good and that society turns us evil. (The Social Contract). Locke presented a third, more neutral view that men are blank slates, or tabula rasa, and are neither good nor evil. (An Essay Concerning Human Understanding).
These concepts play into answering how hospitality is a mark of civilization. Under Hobbes’ concept of the nature of man, hospitality toward strangers is clearly a mark of civilization because, if humanity is generally brutish without civilized society, this would mean that there is no generosity without societal obligation. Under Locke’s theory, men are neither good nor evil, meaning that without civilization, some people may be generous to strangers, while others would treat them ambivalently and neither treatment would be considered good or bad. However, with the moral obligations presented by society such as xenia or Judeo-Christian religious views, all men are at least somewhat constrained to help. Therefore, this would indicate that in a place where everyone is required to help strangers, there is civilization.
Arguing for treatment of strangers as a mark of civilization under Rousseau’s view of the nature of man is a little trickier, but is still easily understood. Rousseau believes that men are inherently good and that society turns men bad. This would mean that if kindness toward strangers is inherently good, there would be no mark of society if all men are treating strangers well. However, we see in Iliad that this is not the case. In Iliad, Paris was a guest of Menelaus but took advantage of societal customs such as xenia to trick his enemies into hosting him and harmed Menelaus’s family. This was not an uncommon occurrence in ancient Greece. Assuming that being kind to a host is inherently good, the strangers are deviating from their natural state of man and are turned evil through taking advantage of a societal custom. This follows Rousseau’s theory that civilization and society turn men evil. Therefore, even under Rousseau it is clear that doing good for strangers is a mark of civilization.
The question of what is the appropriate treatment of strangers is a moral one. The answer to this question can be answered in a large range from there is no duty owed, to there is a religious obligation, or a nearly-legal customary expectation. No matter how this question is answered, however, it is a mark of civilization as the treatment of strangers demonstrates a deviation from the natural man as defined by philosophers.
